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INTRODUCTION
Twenty years of our gathering for the Fordham International
Intellectual Property Conference have seen the United States patent
regime transition from a Golden to a Silver Age. During the
inaugural 1992 conference, the United States stubbornly persisted
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in idiosyncratic practicesnotably a first-to-invent priority
system1 and a seventeen-year patent term.2 Still a relatively new
institution, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal
Circuit”) had reached its maturity and accepted laudatory remarks
from the Supreme Court.3 Observers trumpeted the high rate of
filing at the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) as a point
of pride, with emphasis placed upon the fact that more than half of
all patents were issued to U.S. citizens.4 And the patent
community remained a small, guild-like order of attorneys and
agents.
Circumstances have changed considerably today. Two decades
later, the United States to a large extent has fallen in line with the
fundamental precepts of the international patent order.5 Courts of
review have, at notable times, critically received the judgments of
the Federal Circuit.6 Unimaginably high filing rates at the USPTO
have become a source of alarm,7 with more than half of all patents
now being issued to foreigners.8 The patent community has
become far more fractured, with many observers holding diverse
perspectives on the effectiveness and moral worth of the patent
system.
Yet reason for tremendous optimism persists. The U.S. patent
laws have nurtured an extraordinary array of technologies that
1

See Adam Isaac Hasson, Domestic Implementation of International Obligations: The
Quest for World Patent Law Harmonization, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 373, 388.
2
See id. at 383.
3
See Warner Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997)
(leaving refinement of the doctrine of equivalents to the Federal Circuit’s “sound
judgment in this area of its special expertise”).
4
Laurence M. Rausch, U.S. Inventors Patent Technologies Around the World, NAT’L
SCI. FOUND. ISSUE BRIEF (Feb. 24, 1999), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/
issuebrf/sib99329.htm.
5
Hasson, supra note 1, at 388 (noting that “the United States . . . has done its part to
implement to goals of TRIPs effectively. . . . [and] has displayed its willingness to alter
its domestic legislation in order to serve global and domestic goals.”).
6
See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (noting “flaws in the
analysis of the Court of Appeals” with respect to nonobviousness).
7
See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 746
(2012) (noting that the USPTO is “overwhelmed with work”).
8
U.S. Patent Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963–2012, U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last
visited Sept. 12. 2012).
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would have been hard to perceive in 1992. New voices have, to a
great extent, confirmed the inherent values of the U.S. patent
system even as they challenge insiders to make it operate more
justly and efficiently. The U.S. patent system, once archaic and
hidebound, has again become an innovator. Reflecting upon the
previous twenty years, and considering what the next two decades
might hold, is the task of this essay.
I. THE END OF THE GOLDEN AGE
In the late 1970s, patent system reform was viewed as a way
for the United States to advance out of the economic malaise in
which the nation found itself. An antidote to a perceived “crisis of
confidence” was the revitalization of the patent system through
such mechanisms as the creation of the Federal Circuit9 and the
enactment of the Hatch-Waxman10 and Bayh-Dole Acts.11 The
resulting Golden Age of Patents—which might be even more
colorfully referenced as the “Steroids Era”12—led to an expansion
of the scope of protection, the range of protectable subject matter,
and the severity of damages imposed against adjudicated
infringers.
As the past two decades progressed, observers increasingly
came to believe that the U.S. patent system had gone too far. As
Justice Breyer would note, “even when patents encourage
innovation and disclosure, ‘too much patent protection can impede
rather than promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’”13 Reports
from the National Academies,14 Federal Trade Commission,15 and
9

See Alfred J. Mangels, The Quiet Revolution in Patents, 13 VA. BUS. ASS’N J. 4, 5
(1987).
10
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585.
11
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015.
12
See Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter Eligibility—A Disease and a Cure, 84 S.
CAL. L. REV. 387, 390 (2011) (referring to the patent system as “a property regime on
steroids.”).
13
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3255 (2010) (quoting Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from dismissal of certiorari)).
14
See THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21st CENTURY (Stephen
A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004).
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economists16 contributed to a chorus of concerns that ultimately
echoed in the halls of Carlyle, Capitol Hill, and Madison Place,
and led to significant changes in attitude and doctrines. The ability
of the patent system to adapt to the changing needs of the
innovative community over the past two decades provides potent
testimony to the self-correcting capabilities of the common law.
This gradual shift in the ethos of the U.S. patent system was
punctuated by several defining moments that are discussed next.
A. Legislative Reform
In recent years some commentators have characterized
Congress as an ineffective intervener in the patent system17 or have
attempted to discourage such interaction in the future.18 In fact,
not only have the past two decades witnessed continuous
legislative involvement with respect to patents, this interaction is
the most defining feature of this era. Whether acting in its
oversight capacity with respect to the USPTO or introducing
changes to the Patent Act, every Congress over the past two
decades—from the 102nd Congress that convened in 1992 to the
112th Congress of 2012—has impacted the patent law.
Two legislative enactments were most significant. The first
was the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA)19 that,
as enhanced by the Intellectual Property and High Technology
Technical Amendments Act of 2002,20 brought extraordinary and
lasting changes to U.S. patent law. The AIPA introduced for the
first time in the United States pre-grant publication of pending

15

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 2003).
16
See, e.g., Patent Nonsense: An End to Frivolous Patents May Finally Be in Sight,
ECONOMIST, (last visited Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/
15479680?story_id=15479680.
17
See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 51, 52 (2010).
18
See, e.g. William C. Rooklidge & Alyson G. Barker, Reform of a Fast-Moving
Target: The Development of Patent Law Since the 2004 National Academies Report, 91 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 153, 199 (2009).
19
American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501.
20
21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002).
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applications,21 provisional rights,22 and prior user rights.23 The
establishment of inter partes reexamination24 was a harbinger of
the opposition-like post-grant processes soon to come.
The AIPA also introduced the concept of a patent term
guarantee.25 Under this system, administrative delays in awarding
a patent may result in an extension of its term.26 One study
estimates that an astounding eighty percent of patents receive term
extension due to USPTO delays.27 The legislation also introduced
the “Request for Continued Examination” or RCE.28 This
mechanism allows applicants to obtain further review of their
applications without the need to file a continuing application or
continued prosecution application.29
The RCE has proven
relatively popular for applicants, in 2010 representing
approximately thirty percent of all applications filed at the
USPTO.30 Yet the RCE has also proven burdensome for the
USPTO—the agency has struggled to reduce inventor reliance
upon these applications as it attempts to reduce its inventory of
unexamined applications.31
More recently, Congress enacted the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act (AIA).32 The most significant reform to U.S. patent
law since the nineteenth century, the AIA caused the United States
to switch to a first-to-file priority regime,33 shift to a full-fledged
system of prior user rights,34 and severely limit the best mode

21

35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2006).
Id. § 154(d).
23
Id. § 273.
24
Id. §§ 311–319.
25
Id. § 154(b).
26
Id.
27
Patent Term Adjustment (PTA) Statistics, PATENTLY-O BLOG (July 27, 2011, 4:30
AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/07/pta.html.
28
35 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2006).
29
Id.
30
Bob Stoll, RCE Filings: The Facts, DIRECTOR’S F.: DAVID KAPPOS’ PUB. BLOG (July
26, 2010, 9:17 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/rce_filings_the_facts.
31
See, e.g., Patrick A. Doody, How to Eliminate the Backlog at the Patent Office, 37
AIPLA Q.J. 395 (2009).
32
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
33
Id. sec. 3, § 100, 125 Stat. at 285.
34
Id. sec. 5, § 273, 125 Stat. at 297.
22
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requirement.35
The AIA also introduced post-grant review
proceedings that are akin to the opposition proceedings found
elsewhere36 and also adopted the global norm of assignee filing.37
The unilateral adoption of global norms promises to reduce the
burdens upon U.S. firms that seek patent rights abroad and gives
the United States a stronger voice in the international intellectual
property community.
Along with these two pieces of landmark legislation, Congress
has frequently introduced additional amendments to the U.S.
Patent Act over the past two decades. For example, 1996
legislation limited the availability of patent protection on methods
of medical treatment.38 Later, section 271, the core infringement
statute, has been amended to account for pharmaceutical patent
litigation,39 the activities of state actors,40 and the requirements of
the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) TRIPS Agreement.41 The
CREATE Act of 2004 adjusted the law of obviousness in order to
account for team research.42 Even more recently, the omnibus
health care reform legislation, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, changed the Patent Act with respect to
biologics.43 All told, the current U.S. Patent Act is a far more
complex and nuanced statute than it was two decades ago.
Finally, even where expressions of congressional interest did
not lead to actual changes to the Patent Act, they often had an
extraordinary influence upon judicial developments. Over the past
decade, developments in U.S. patent law have followed an unusual
two step-procedure beginning with, the airing of considerable
industry concerns during a congressional hearing, followed by, the
35

Id. sec. 15, § 282, 125 Stat. at 328.
Id. sec. 6, §§ 321–329, 125 Stat. at 305.
37
Id. sec. 4, § 118, 125 Stat. at 296.
38
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 616, § 287,
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-67–3009-68 (1996).
39
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.
40
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560,
106 Stat. 4230 (1992).
41
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
42
Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-453, sec. 2, § 103, 118 Stat. 3596.
43
Pub. L. No. 111-148, sec. 7002(l), § 262, 124 Stat. 119, 80821 (2010).
36

C06_THOMAS (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

3/5/2013 3:26 PM

U.S. PATENT LAW 1992–2012

531

issuance of a judicial opinion some months later that endeavors to
address those concerns. For example, legislative proposals to alter
the concerning injunctive relief, venue, damages, willful patent
infringement, and extraterritorial protection preceded the judicial
opinions in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,44 In re TS Tech
USA Corp.,45 Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,46 In re
Seagate Technology,47 and Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T.48 Although
correlation does not imply causation, it is hard to escape the
conclusion that the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit were, at the
very least, aware of congressional interest in reforming patent law
doctrines before the courts themselves did so.
B. Markman
The honor of the most important judicial ruling of the past two
decades must go to the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision, Markman
v. Westview Instruments, Inc.49 There the Court confirmed the
Federal Circuit’s earlier holding that claim construction constituted
a question of law reserved to the courts.50 For contemporary
readers of these two opinions, it is not hard to see that if the
participating jurists fully realized the implications of this
seemingly straightforward conclusion, they did not say so–for
Markman forever altered the patent litigation process in the United
States.51
In the post-Markman era, claim construction hearings where
the trial judge determines the meaning of claim language, have
become a fixture of patent infringement lawsuits.52 Judicial
construction of patent claims was intended to provide numerous
benefits, including increasing the certainty of the scope of patent
44

547 U.S. 388 (2006) (addressing the issue of awarding permanent injunctive relief to
plaintiffs).
45
551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (addressing the issue of venue transfers).
46
580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (addressing the issue of damages).
47
497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (addressing the issue of willful
infringement).
48
550 U.S. 437 (2007) (addressing the issue of the territorial extent of patent rights).
49
517 U.S. 370 (1996).
50
Id. at 390–91.
51
See Edmund J. Sease, Markman Misses the Mark, Miserably, 2004 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 99, 102 (2004).
52
See id.
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rights, encouraging settlement, and providing the Federal Circuit—
a court with elevated subject matter expertise—with the final word
on the subject.53 In order to accommodate these hearings, popular
patent enforcement fora have taken the creative step of
promulgating doctrine-specific procedural rules to augment the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.54
The jury remains out on Markman. One particularly blunt
jurist described the case as leading jurists to “sophistry and
fiction”;55 whereas, to practitioners, claim construction can be seen
as a “series of seemingly contradictory axioms and
promulgations.”56 As well, the Federal Circuit is widely regarded
as reversing too many claim constructions.57 Because essentially
all other rulings in patent cases depend upon a sustainable
interpretation of the claims—for example, whether the patented
invention would have been obvious in view of the state of the art
or whether the accused product infringes58—a Federal Circuit
reversal often implies an entirely new trial on remand.59 Still,
some level of uncertainty may be socially desirable in that highly
certain claims may be difficult to draft and overly enforced.60
More practically, the Markman process also encourages trial
judges to become more deeply involved in patent trials.61
The Federal Circuit has issued over one thousand opinions
directed towards assessing the meaning of claims since Markman

53

See Jonas McDavit, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Obstacles to Using Issue
Preclusion in a Post-Markman World, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 45, 50–54 (2006).
54
See Peter Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and
Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 787–88 (2010).
55
Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 333 n.7 (D.
Del.1995).
56
Andrew B. Dzeguze, Did Markman and Philips Answer the Right Questions? A
Review of the Fractured State of Claim Construction Law and the Potential Use of Equity
to Unify It, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 457, 458 (2007).
57
See David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1073,
1075 (2010).
58
See id. at 1078.
59
See, e.g., id. at 1087.
60
See Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1737, 1758 (2011).
61
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 57, at 1083.
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was handed down.62 Over the next two decades it seems unlikely
that the efforts of litigants and the courts towards this subject will
decrease. Yet whether the collective efforts of the patent
community can diminish the uncertainty attending claim
construction remains to be seen.
C. The Death of the Doctrine of Equivalents
A defining feature of the shift from the Golden Age to the
Silver Age has been the precipitous decline in judicial application
of the Doctrine of Equivalents.63 Perhaps the poster child of an
inventor-friendly patent system, the Doctrine of Equivalents was
applied robustly by the Federal Circuit in its infancy.64 By any
measure, however, successful use of the Doctrine of Equivalents
has dropped dramatically over the past two decades.65 As a result,
it appears that more so than any time in the modern history of the
U.S. patent system, patent plaintiffs who wish to win must rely
almost exclusively upon a theory of textual infringement.66
Different rationales have been advanced to explain this
phenomenon. Some suggest that the Markman process caused
judges who had rejected a literal infringement argument to be
negatively disposed to equivalency as well.67 Others believe that
the Federal Circuit was far less likely to hold a patent invalid in
comparison to its predecessor courts; as a result, district courts
came to rely more heavily upon infringement rulings when
resolving disputes.68 The singular nature of the Federal Circuit
may have also played a role. When patent infringement appeals
were consolidated at the Federal Circuit, that court’s jurists began
hearing an increased number of cases involving the Doctrine of

62

Menell et al., supra note 54, at 718.
See David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2011); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed)
Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955 (2007); Lee Petherbridge,
On the Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1371 (2010).
64
See Schwartz, supra note 63, at 1203.
65
See id.
66
See, e.g., Allison & Lemley, supra note 5763, at 977–78.
67
Id.
68
Matthew D. Henry & John L. Turner, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s
Impact on Patent Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 114–15 (2006).
63
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Equivalents.69 As they gained more experience over a period of
years, repeated assertions that particular claim wordings covered
distinct accused infringements may have simply become less
compelling.70 After all, just how many times can a claimed
manual product cover an automatic device; a mechanical switch be
akin to an electrical one; and a resilient component serve as an
equivalent to a malleable part? Familiarity may have bred
contempt.
To some, the fall of the Doctrine of Equivalents may be a
salutatory development.71 After all, each inventor may obtain as
many claims as he is willing to pay for. He may even seek to
reissue a patent where his initial claim drafting efforts proved
insufficient.72 But to others, a robust Doctrine of Equivalents
allows “inventors to procure a small number of broadly
constructed patent claims.”73 Perhaps one contributing factor to
the enormous increase in the number of patent filings at the
USPTO is the judicial desire for precision claim drafting rather
than resort to theories of nontextual infringement.74 Given that the
patent system is one in which many enter, but few leave with
valuable intellectual property rights, whether society as a whole—
and the USPTO in particular—is best served by a cabined Doctrine
of Equivalents remains an open question.75
D. State Street Bank
The past twenty years have witnessed the spectacular rise and
fall of U.S. patents on such post-industrial inventions as business
methods and tax strategies. Surely the high-water mark of
protectionism was the 1998 decision in State Street Bank & Trust

69

Id. at 113–14.
Id. at 114.
71
See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming
the Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1163–64 (2004).
72
35 U.S.C. § 251.
73
John R. Thomas, The Story of Graver Tank v. Linde: Intellectual Property
Infringement in Flux, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 298, 325 (Jane C. Ginsburg &
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 326.
70
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Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.76 The Federal Circuit there
rejected the “ill-conceived” business methods exception to
patentable subject matter.77 The Court of Appeals further held that
a data-processing system for implementing an investment structure
consisted of patentable subject matter because it claimed not
merely an abstract idea, but rather a programmed machine that
produced “a useful, concrete and tangible result.”78
Following the issuance of the lenient standard of State Street
Bank, the entire range of human endeavor appeared to constitute
patentable subject matter.
Patents issued on such diverse
inventions as tax avoidance schemes,79 sports methods,80 insurance
techniques,81 and marketing strategies.82 Identifying a newly
issued patent from an improbable discipline became a common
parlor trick in the intellectual property industry. After all, who can
forget patents on products and processes for character
assessment,83 generating dinner party conversation,84 promoting
understanding among couples,85 exercising a cat,86 or swinging on
a swing?87
The controversial legal principles promulgated in State Street
Bank have for the most part been repudiated. The Supreme Court
opinion in Bilski v. Kappos expressly rejected State Street Bank’s
holding that anything useful could potentially be patented.88 The
Court’s more recent opinion in Mayo v. Prometheus also
emphasized the significance of patentable subject matter doctrines
within the patent system.89 Congress has also become involved,
76

149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1375.
78
Id. at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
79
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,716,104 (filed Mar. 4, 2005).
80
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,066,848 (filed May 6, 2004).
81
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,966,693 (filed May 7, 1996).
82
See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,234,514 (filed July 12, 2008).
83
U.S. Patent No. 5,190,458 (filed Apr. 17,1991).
84
U.S. Patent No. 6,464,222 (filed Mar. 21, 2000).
85
U.S. Patent No. 6,631,904 (filed Mar. 21, 2001).
86
U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed Nov. 2, 1993).
87
U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000).
88
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
89
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1304 (2012).
77
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legislatively eliminating patents on human organisms90 and
severely limiting patents on tax strategies91 through the LeahySmith America Invents Act.
For the U.S. patent system, State Street Bank was an
experiment that yielded dubious results. The world has seen little
evidence of improved innovation in business methods, finance, tax
strategies, the social sciences, and other disciplines that for a
decade or so were broadly patentable.92 A more certain legacy of
State Street Bank will include an increase in USPTO workload and
a growth in deep-seated concern about the integrity of the patent
system.93 As innovation continually redefines existing fields of
endeavor and establishes new ones, this experience suggests the
wisdom of expanding the patent system with both caution and
input from impacted industry.
E. The BlackBerry Case
Each generation may be assigned a leading case that draws
public attention to the patent system not because it develops new
legal principles, but rather for its ambition and impact upon
everyday lives. For an older cohort, that case was probably
Polaroid v. Kodak.94 That litigation resulted in a damages award
of $873 million95 and ultimately caused Kodak to abandon the
instant camera business altogether.96 Polaroid v. Kodak conveyed
a forceful message to innovators and investors about the value of
U.S. patent rights as defined by the Federal Circuit.

90

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284, 340
(2011).
91
Id. § 14, 125 Stat. at 327–28.
92
See, e.g., Stefania Fusco, Is the Use of Patents Promoting the Creation of New Types
of Securities?, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 243 (2009) (describing
that the rate of innovation for securities has remained constant).
93
See, e.g., Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L. J. 470, 535–32 (2011).
94
Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
95
Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., Civ.A. No. 76-1634-MA., 1991 WL 4087, at
*5 (D. Mass. Jan. 11, 1991).
96
Kate H. Murashige, Harmonization of Patent Laws, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 591, 593
(1994).
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Over the past twenty years, the leading piece of litigation is
arguably NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd.,97 better known as
the BlackBerry case. A jury had found Research In Motion (RIM)
guilty of willful infringement of NTP’s patents concerning wireless
e-mail communication services, a judgment affirmed by the
Federal Circuit.98 As a result, a vast number of BlackBerry users
in the United States faced the unsettling prospect of an imminent
cessation of service pursuant to a court-ordered injunction.99
However, prior to the district court’s decision on issuing a
permanent injunction, NTP and RIM signed a $612.5 million
licensing and settlement agreement.100 The settlement ended the
litigation and ensured uninterrupted operation of the BlackBerry
service.101
The BlackBerry case sent a number of potent signals. The case
was litigated on a contingency basis, resulting in a lucrative payout
for NTP’s counsel and encouraging this controversial practice
going forward.102 The Federal Circuit also held that NTP’s U.S.
patents could to some degree cover activity performed in
Canada.103 The recognition that U.S. patent rights could reach
abroad, despite the absence of a specific Patent Act provision
authorizing extraterritorial coverage, suggests the self-recognition
of the U.S. system within an international patent order.
This litigation also introduced to a broader community the
concept of patent trolling and the Federal Circuit’s “general rule”
that upon a finding of infringement, a court should issue a
permanent injunction against adjudicated infringers.104 NTP
provided no mobile e-mail service of its own; indeed, it marketed

97

418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1325–26.
99
Mark Heinzl & Amol Sharma, RIM to Pay NTP $612.5 Million To Settle Blackberry
Patent Suit, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2006, at A1.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
See Anna Mayergoyz, Lessons from Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls, 42
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 241, 250 (2009).
103
NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317(referring to NTP’s method’s claims, which has a different
“use” analysis than those for a system or device).
104
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
98
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no products or services whatsoever.105 Yet under prevailing legal
principles NTP could control public access to the fabulously
popular BlackBerry products and services.106 Although RIM
averted an injunction through a costly settlement, NTP’s success
undoubtedly inspired a growing number of non-practicing patent
owners to seek to monetize their intellectual property entities
through licensing and litigation.
More impactful than any academic study, the BlackBerry
litigation suggested to many that the patent system was out of
alignment with mainstream legal concepts and the needs of the
high technology community.107 Little wonder then that the
Supreme Court became increasingly interested in the patent system
about the time of the BlackBerry case, and that the harbingers of
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act began to reach the floor of
the House of Representatives.108 The BlackBerry case inspired
significant changes to the U.S. patent system, ones that we are still
working through in 2012.
F. New Voices
Two decades ago, discussion of the patent system was arguably
limited almost exclusively to the patent bar. The study of patent
law was confined to an isolated corner of the legal academy, few
individuals who were not admitted to practice before the USPTO
knew much about patents at all, and most law firms engaged in
patent practice did little else.109 The primary venue for organized
discussion of the field was the American Intellectual Property Law
Association (AIPLA), the national bar association for patent
105

See Jennifer Lane, NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd.: Inventions are Global,
But Politics are Still Local—An Examination of the BlackBerry Case, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 59, 65 n.50 (2006).
106
See Heinzl & Sharma, supra note 99.
107
See Gerard N. Magliocca, BlackBerries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils
of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1809 (2007).
108
See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005); Patent Reform
Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260,
111th Cong. (2009).
109
Cf. Sam Favate, Law Students, Get Thee to a Patent Law Class, WALL ST. J. L.
BLOG (Oct. 17, 2011, 2:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/10/17/law-students-getthee-to-a-patent-law-class/ (encouraging law students to pursue a career as a patent
lawyer, given the potential demand from the business world).
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lawyers. Yet this discussion was less in the nature of debate than
of reaffirmation of existing views. Most of those who did think
about patent law in 1992 saw things the same way—namely, that
more robust patent rights were not only in their own professional
interest, but also in the national interest.
Today new voices wield influence within the patent system.
The National Academies and Federal Trade Commission issued
influential reports that helped shape the Leahy-Smith America
Invents Act.110 Lobbying groups with such Orwellian names as the
Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform,111 Coalition for Patent
Fairness,112 and Innovation Alliance113 also influenced the text of
the legislation and its current implementation at the USPTO.114
And thanks to the Bayh-Dole Act,115 the university community
also asserts its perceived interests in patent matters, particularly
through the Association of University Technology Managers.116
The practice of patent law has also been dramatically
transformed over the past two decades. For most of their history,
U.S. patent professionals operated within a more collegial, unified
bar that lacked the natural divisions found among antitrust, labor,
and other sorts of lawyers. Of late, however, the patent bar
appears to be far more fractured. Patent lawyers representing
pharmaceutical firms have in recent years expressed vehement
disagreement with those working for electronics and consumer

110

THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A.
Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004); FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND
POLICY (Oct. 2003).
111
THE COALITION FOR 21ST CENTURY PATENT REFORM, http://www.patentsmatter.com
(last visited Sept. 6, 2012).
112
COALITION FOR PATENT FAIRNESS, http://www.patentfairness.org (last visited Sept. 6,
2012).
113
INNOVATION ALLIANCE, http://www.innovationalliance.net (last visited Sept. 6,
2012).
114
Letter from Mass Industry to Speaker John Boehner and Democratic Leader Nancy
Pelosi (June 13, 2011), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/Patent%20Reform%
20PDFS/Mass%20Industry.pdf (supporting the America Invents Act).
115
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015.
116
See Todd Sherer, Preview: AUTM U.S. Licensing Survey: FY2011, BIOTECHNOW
(Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.biotech-now.org/public-policy/patently-biotech/2012 /08/
preview-autm-u-s-licensing-surveyfy2011.
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device providers. In-house counsel have clashed with law firms.
Moreover, patent lawyers have increasingly joined general practice
firms following the collapse of venerable specialty firms such as
Darby & Darby, Fish & Neave, and Pennie & Edmonds—a trend
that has arguably increased the mainstreaming of patent law.117
The number and diversity of academics with interests in patent
law has also exploded over the past twenty years in the United
States. Once an obscure specialty that lived a marginal life among
the professorate, patent law is now taught in the majority of the
nation’s law schools and is the subject of numerous articles in
leading law reviews each year. Scholarship continues to inform
and enrich our understanding of the patent regime, a welcome
development for what was once one of the most under-theorized of
legal disciplines.
II. THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS
The past two decades saw a number of surprising
developments. In 1992, few had predicted that business method
patents would be a focus of judicial and congressional scrutiny,
that Markman hearings were on the horizon, or that Congress
would alter such fundamentals as a seventeen-year term, first-toinvent priority principle, and best mode requirement. This history
suggests that forecasting key moments of the next twenty years
constitutes at best a precarious proposition.
This Article
nonetheless explores themes that may come to dominate the
discussion at the next twenty Fordham International Intellectual
Property Law and Policy Conferences.
A. The Rise of Regulatory Exclusivities
As suggested by the phrase “patent medicine,” patents have
long played a leading role within the intensely science-based
pharmaceutical industry.118 That role seems destined to decrease
117

Elie Mystal, Nationwide Dissolution Watch: Darby & Darby Going Down, ABOVE
LAW (Mar. 12, 2010, 9:34 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/03/nationwidedissolution-watch-darby-darby-going-down/.
118
Patent medicines were “preparations that often contained ingredients such as opium
and alcohol and claimed to cure many if not all diseases.” Patent Medicines, DRUGSTORE
THE
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over the next two decades. The reason is that a new intellectual
property right, regulatory exclusivities, is poised to become the
primary source of exclusivity for health-based inventions including
small-molecule pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and biologics.
As originally structured by the Orphan Drug Act119 and the
Hatch-Waxman Act,120 regulatory exclusivities were relatively
short-term rights that supplemented the patent system. Orphan
drugs were afforded seven years of relatively limited regulatory
exclusivity for diseases and conditions affecting fewer than
200,000 patients in the United States.121 New chemical entities not
previously approved by the FDA receive five years of
protection,122but if the FDA requires a clinical trial with respect to
a product that does qualify as a new chemical entity, then three
The Food and Drug
years of protection are provided.123
Administration (FDA) Modernization Act of 1997 then augmented
these terms by six months as a reward for conducting pediatric
trials of drugs.124
More recent legislation has expanded these exclusivities in
terms of scope and duration. Congress recently provided for
twelve years of regulatory exclusivity for biologics.125 And some
have noted that the analogous European regime provides for eight
years of exclusivity before authorization for a generic may be
submitted and two further years before it may be approved.126
These dates are augmented by an additional year if the sponsor
obtains further authorization for one or more new therapeutic
indications for the product.127 It takes little imagination to assert
that the regulatory exclusivity periods for small-molecule
MUSEUM (last visited Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.drugstoremuseum.com/sections/ level_
info2.php?level=3&level_id=26.
119
Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).
120
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585.
121
21 U.S.C. § 360cc (2002).
122
Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2010).
123
Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii) (2010).
124
Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296.
125
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
126
Council Directive 2004/27, art.10, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 34, 39 (EC).
127
Id.
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pharmaceuticals under the Hatch-Waxman Act should be extended
to the terms available in Europe.
With health care forming a key political issue for the United
States, Congress seems likely to revisit the issue of intellectual
property rights for healthcare innovation in the near future. Yet
amending the Patent Act lacks convenience in comparison with
fortifying regulatory exclusivity. Fine-tuning the patent laws to
meet the needs of the healthcare industry may upset the balance of
protection and competition in other industries. Further, the WTO
TRIPS Agreement requires signatories to provide patent protection
“without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of
technology and whether products are imported or locally
produced.”128 But TRIPS seems to prohibit discrimination in favor
of drug patents as well as against them. On the other hand, TRIPS
places few restrictions upon the award of regulatory exclusivities
by WTO members; indeed, unlike patents, they are arguably not
even required.129
Enhanced regulatory exclusivity offers other advantages for
brand-name drug companies over stronger patent protection. First,
patents provide not so much the right to exclude but the right to try
to exclude.130 Generic firms frequently make successful arguments
that the brand-name firm’s patents are invalid or not infringed.131
In contrast, regulatory exclusivity operates without the need for
owners to bring costly and risky infringement actions, and from its
more limited duration, regulatory exclusivity is a better temporal
fit with the life cycle of a pharmaceutical product.132 Regulatory
exclusivity periods typically do not begin until a product is on the
market, while some of a patent’s term may run before that time.133

128
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197.
129
Id. at art. 39.
130
See Sheila Kadura, Is An Absolute Ban on Reverse Payments the Appropriate Way to
Prevent Anticompetitive Agreements Between Branded- and Generic-Pharmaceutical
Companies?, 86 TEX. L. REV. 647, 654 (2008).
131
Id.
132
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 351–53 (2007).
133
Id. at. 351–52.
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The proposed Modernizing Our Drug & Diagnostics
Evaluation and Regulatory Network Cures Act, or MODDERN
Cures Act,134 provides an example of a framework of innovation
incentives that emphasizes regulatory exclusivity over patents.
Under that proposed legislation, the drug sponsor must identify a
therapy that fulfills an “unmet medical need” to the FDA.135 As
part of this identification, the sponsor indicates the patents
associated with that “dormant therapy” and asserts that they will
provide fourteen or fewer years of effective protection.136 The
sponsor also files a waiver of those rights.137 If the FDA agrees
with the sponsor and ultimately grants marketing approval, then
the sponsor obtains fifteen years of marketing exclusivity.138 All
of the identified patents are given an extended term of up to fifteen
years after the product is approved.139 Any term after the fifteen
years is then disclaimed via the voluntary waiver.140 It remains to
be seen how much traction the MODDERN Cures Act will see in
Congress, but the legislation provides a significant paradigm shift
for patents and regulatory exclusivities—one that might come to
dominate the innovative healthcare industry over the next twenty
years.
B. The Changing Nature of National Treatment
The hollowed principle of national treatment forms the core
paradigm of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (Paris Convention).141 The Paris Convention in turn has
long served as the foundational international agreement underlying
the global patent order.142 Yet national treatment will likely

134

H.R. 3497, 112th Cong. (2011).
Id. § 201(a)(2)(A).
136
Id. § 201(d).
137
Id. § 201(b)(3).
138
Id. § 202(a)(1).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, opened for signature
Mar. 20, 1883, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1630, 828 U.N.T.S.
305.
142
See Understanding Industrial Property, WIPO 1, 4–7, (Pub. No. 895(E)),
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/intproperty/895/wipo_pub_895.pdf.
135
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undergo a significant, softening transformation in coming years,
motivated by the extraordinary popularity of the patent system.
Today virtually every national patent office faces a large
inventory of unexamined patent applications.143 The USPTO in
particular has engaged in several creative responses in order to
address its backlog.144 One reaction that seems to have staying
power is the agency’s bid to privilege domestic customers. Under
the new “Three-Track Proposal,”145 foreign applicants will be
effectively required to obtain a patent in their homeland before the
USPTO will consider their domestic applications.146 The USPTO
will then provide what is effectively an expedited review of those
applications based in part upon examination tasks previously
performed abroad.
This system comports with the principle of national treatment
only through a clever sleight of hand. Preferred treatment is not
afforded to U.S. nationals per se; rather, it is given to those who
filed in the USPTO first, regardless of their nationality.147
However, because a firm’s home market is typically its most
important, filing in one’s own patent office first is the current
norm. Whether the Three-Track Proposal will influence traditional
international filing practice, pushing more foreigners to file first at
the USPTO, remains to be seen.
An international patent regime centered upon the office of first
filing is likely not the sort of high-minded collaboration that
optimistic supporters of patent worksharing envisioned.148 Yet this
system would amount to cooperation of a sort. And given the
crushing workloads faced by patent offices around the world, the
decline of the national treatment principle proposed by the USPTO
seems inevitable.

143

JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PATENT
ADMINISTRATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR INNOVATION POLICY (2011).
144
Id.
145
David Kappos, The Three-Track Proposal: Putting Applicants in Control of
Examination Timing, DIRECTOR’S F.: DAVID KAPPOS’ PUB. BLOG, (June 15, 2010, 1:14
PM), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/the_three_track_proposal_putting.
146
See Thomas, supra note 143, at 11–12.
147
See id.
148
See id. at 9.
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C. Parallel Importation
The high and growing costs of health care in the United States
suggest that the parallel importation of patented pharmaceuticals
will again be the subject of serious discussion. Members of
Congress are well aware that prescription drugs often cost more in
the United States than in other countries. In order to realize cost
savings, many individuals import medications from abroad—but in
doing so they commit a patent infringement under current Federal
Circuit case law.149 Congress appears virtually certain to alter this
state of affairs in coming years, assuming that the Supreme Court
does not act first.
In the 112th Congress, Senate Bill 319, the Pharmaceutical
Market Access and Drug Safety Act of 2011 would expressly
allow for the parallel importation of pharmaceuticals.150 Most of
the bill is directed towards amendments to food and drug law, but
the legislation also accounts for the patent implications of parallel
importation.151 In particular, section 4(d) of Senate Bill 319 would
amend the Patent Act to provide that importation into the United
States a drug that was first sold abroad by or under authority of the
owner or licensee of such patent does not constitute a patent
infringement.152 The effect of Senate Bill 319 would be to
incorporate into the U.S. Patent Act, at least on a pharmaceuticalspecific basis, a doctrine known as “international exhaustion.”153
Although this bill appears to have little chance of enactment in
2012, it provides a glimpse into a likely future addition to the
Patent Act.
The courts may beat Congress to the punch, at least with
respect to the notion of international exhaustion. On April 16,
2012, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kirtsaeng v.

149

See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (describing parallel patent infringement in the context of a camera lens).
150
S. 319, 112th Cong. § 4(d) (2011).
151
See Id.
152
Id. § 4(d).
153
See id.; See also Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The
WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT’L
L. 333, 340–42 (2000) (describing the difference between national and international
exhaustion).
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John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,154 a parallel importation case involving
copyrights. The question presented to the Court is:
How do Section 602(a)(1) of the Copyright Act,
which prohibits the importation of a work without
the authority of the copyright’s owner, and Section
109(a) of the Copyright Act, which allows the
owner of a copy “lawfully made under this title” to
sell or otherwise dispose of the copy without the
copyright owner’s permission, apply to a copy that
was made and legally acquired abroad and then
imported into the United States?155
The Ninth Circuit has held that the Copyright Act’s reference
to works “lawfully made under this title” means “lawfully made in
the United States.”156 Under this view, U.S. copyright law adopts
a “domestic exhaustion” principle under which the parallel
importation of a protected work of authorship constitutes a
copyright infringement.157 An equally plausible ruling is that the
phrase “lawfully made under this title” means merely that the
manufacture of the work was authorized by the U.S. copyright
holder—even if the manufacturing took place outside the United
States.158 Under this view, U.S. copyright law would adopt an
“international exhaustion” principle under which the parallel
importation of legitimate gray market goods does not constitute an
infringement.159
The Court’s ruling in Kirtsaeng is of great moment to the
patent system. Congress has not yet stipulated the exhaustion
principles pertinent to patent law. But the Federal Circuit has
followed the first line of reasoning above to conclude that the U.S.

154

132 S. Ct. 1905 (Apr. 16, 2012).
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/
case-files/cases/kirtsaeng-v-john-wiley-sons-inc/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
156
See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2008).
157
See Chiappetta, supra note 153, at 340–42 (using the term “national exhaustion”
instead of “domestic exhaustion”).
158
See Alexander B. Pope, A Second Look at First Sale: An International Look at U.S
Copyright Exhaustion, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 201, 203–04 (2011).
159
See id. at 205–08.
155
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patent system does not accept international exhaustion.160 Should
the Court rule differently in Kirtsaeng, the Federal Circuit case law
would likely be viewed as overturned as well.
Through one mechanism or the other, the next two decades will
likely see the abrupt introduction of international exhaustion into
the U.S. patent system, at least with respect to pharmaceuticals.
As a result, current experience with respect to the free movement
of patented goods in the European Union provides a likely
precursor to U.S. patent regime of the future. As a voluminous
literature has already been realized,161 the impact of this change
upon orderly markets, patient safety, and innovation incentives in
the United States would be profound.
D. Future Legislation
When President Obama signed the AIA into law on September
16, 2011,162 some may have supposed that Congress would be out
of the patent business for quite some time. After all, the new law
had a long pendency of many years on the Hill.163 Further, the
most recent predecessor legislation dealing with multiple patent
principles, the AIPA, had been enacted in 1999.164 These factors
may suggest either that Congress passes any sort of patent bill only
with considerable difficulty, or alternatively that Congress does not
act rashly with respect to patent reform.
Still other factors suggest that Congress remains keenly
interested in patent matters and is likely to again intervene sooner,
rather than later in the field. Members of Congress and their staff
160
See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
161
See, e.g., Vincent Chiappetta, Patent Exhaustion: What’s It Good For?, 51 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1087 (2011); Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to
Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and A Few Other Things, 21
MICH. J. INT'L L. 333, 362 (2000) (balancing private incentives and public access for
patents); Robert A. Paul, Black and White: A Path Toward Clarity for Copyright Law
and Gray Market Goods, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 155 (2012)
(discussing negative economic effects of job loss and increased costs).
162
Richard Maulsby, President Obama Signs America Invents Act, INVENTORSEYE,
(Oct. 2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/independent/ eye/201110/
americainventsact.jsp.
163
See Sarah Tran, Patent Powers, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 595, 626 (2012).
164
Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999).
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have climbed a steep learning curve to develop expertise in a
sophisticated field, suggesting greater receptivity to difficult patent
concepts that may not have attracted legislative interest in previous
years. The grandly named patent lobbying groups, such as the
Coalition for Patent Fairness and the Coalition for 21st Century
Patent Reform, continue to exist and remain active on the Hill.165
Moreover, patent matters frequently brush up against issues of
more central congressional concern, in particular health care.
Further, while the AIA is the lengthiest piece of patent
legislation ever enacted in the United States,166 it was by no means
a comprehensive patent bill. A comparison of early drafts of the
legislation with the new law reveals that many contentious issues
remain left on the table. Among them was a proposed shift to
ecumenical pre-grant publication of pending applications, changes
to the law of inequitable conduct, venue reform, and significant
alterations to the rules governing the award of damages.167 Recent
judicial opinions have addressed some of these issues, but
unsurprisingly they have not addressed the concerns of all
stakeholders.168
At a minimum, in the near future we can surely expect the
introduction of a “technical amendments” bill that tinkers with
some of the provisions of the AIA once the bar and USPTO have
had time fully to digest it. As suggested by such legislation
165
See Amanda Becker, Patent Reform Measure Ignited Fierce Lobbying Effort, WASH.
POST, Mar. 27, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/capital_business/
patent-reform-measure-ignited-fierce-lobbying-effort/2011/03/25/AFzD9VkB_
story.html.
166
Robert A. Armitage, Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: Will It Be Nation’s Most
Significant Patent Act Since 1790?, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, SEPT. 23, 2011, at 1,
available
at
http://www.wlf.org/Upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/09-23-11
Armitage_LegalBackgrounder.pdf.
167
See, e.g., America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 18(d) (2011) (discussing
proposed patent venue infringement actions); America Invents Act: Hearing on H.R.
1249 Before the Intellectual Property, Competition, and the Internet Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011) (statements of Secretary Kappos
supporting removal of changes to damages venue considerations from bill and
Congresswoman Lofgren supporting “more work” on the inequitable conduct provisions
and the one-year grace period for publication of applications).
168
John R. Thomas, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Recent
Developments in Patent Administration: Implications for Innovation Policy (July 28,
2011).
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subsequent to the AIPA—the Intellectual Property and High
Technology Technical Amendments Act of 2002169—this bill may
itself include significant changes that belie its modest title. In sum,
an increasingly complex Patent Act was a hallmark of the past two
decades, a trend that should continue going forward.
E. USPTO Rule-Making Authority
For most of its long history the USPTO has been a relatively
sleepy agency that played a minor role in intellectual property
policy matters. For an entity that issued each U.S. patent, the
USPTO actually played a relatively minor role even within in the
patent system. Innovation policy matters were dealt with by
Congress and the courts.170 The position of the head of the agency
was something of a sinecure; other elite personnel were viewed as
something of a clannish and insular group that was insensitive to
concerns of patent applicants.171
This view of the USPTO, already outmoded, is likely to
become wholly archaic over the next two decades. The agency has
become increasingly innovative as it has launched an array of
programs and initiatives that have been successful in reducing its
backlog of filed but unexamined applications.172 It has been
praised for the transparency of its decision-making processes.173 It
has attracted new staff with exceptional professional
backgrounds.174 And by opening a branch office in Detroit, to be
followed by others in locations distant from Alexandria,

169

21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002).
170
WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41638, PATENT
REFORM IN THE 112TH CONGRESS: INNOVATION ISSUES (2011).
171
See generally id. at 5.
172
JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41995, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
PATENT ADMINISTRATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR INNOVATION POLICY 7–8 (2011).
173
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Virginia,175 the agency will have an increasingly national presence.
These branch offices should not only improve the ability of the
agency to hire and retain quality examiners, they should also
improve relationships with the diverse industries and user
communities found in the United States.
If the USPTO can continue to expand its growing reputation
for accuracy, productivity, and resourcefulness, the congressional
grant of rule-making authority to the agency seems a distinct
possibility over the next two decades. Current law provides the
USPTO with the ability, among others, to establish regulations that
“govern the conduct of proceedings” before it.176 However, it
should be appreciated that “Congress has not vested the [USPTO]
with any general substantive rulemaking power . . . .”177 Congress
has thought seriously about expanding the agency’s authority,
however,178 and the possibility that the USPTO will one day enjoy
the same rulemaking ability as its peer agencies is not out of the
question.
This conferral of authority would cause the U.S. patent system
to operate quite differently than it does today.179 In 2012, the
courts engage in day-to-day governance of the U.S. patent system,
a quite unusual, patrician regime that lacks political
accountability.180 Under this system, the courts set, for example,
the standard of obviousness in individual judicial proceedings; the
agency must then follow these holdings.181 USPTO possession of
rulemaking authority would flip this system on its head. The
agency would engage in rulemaking procedures to set the standard
of obviousness with public input; the courts would then follow the
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See, e.g., Ryan Vacca, Acting Like an Administrative Agency: The Federal Circuit
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promulgated rule. Whether the patent system will advance into a
system of democratic governance over the next two decades, or
remain under its current, sui generis regime of concentrated
command by a handful of elites remains to be seen.
F. Patent Aggregation
The past few years have witnessed the accumulation of vast
armories of patents by manufacturing firms, service providers, and
independent aggregators alike. Current entities such as Acacia
Research, Round Rock Research, and RPX have quietly assembled
large portfolios of patents both for defensive purposes and as assets
capable of monetization.182 The largest aggregator, Intellectual
Ventures, is believed to hold as many as 60,000 patents—a number
that ranks fifth among patent holders based in the United States.183
The trend towards patent aggregation will surely continue over
the next two decades, but on an order of magnitude and level of
sophistication that will seem staggering by the standards of 2012.
A distinctive possibility within our lifetimes is that the top ten
patent holders in the United States may, in combination, hold on
the order of one-quarter of all U.S. patents—and an even higher
percentage of commercially valuable ones.184 Finally, although the
aggregation phenomenon is most pronounced in the United States,
it seems likely to be heading overseas over the next twenty
years.185
Expanding patent aggregation holds numerous implications for
the U.S. patent system. First, this concentration of patents implies
market power which, in turn, suggests the increasing mobilization
of the antitrust law to police patent law’s excesses. Second, savvy
accused infringers may increasingly enlist an aggregator in order to
identify a patent within their portfolio capable of sustaining a
countersuit against their accusers. This strategy, if widely
employed, could limit the value of patents held by manufacturers
and service providers.
182
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But on the other hand, the patent system has traditionally
sustained fragmented proprietary rights held by diverse owners.
This environment has contributed to the difficulties faced by
manufacturers and service providers to determine whether patent
rights apply to their marketplace offerings. It has also effectively
softened the impact of patent rights. Proprietors would appear
more reluctant to assert one or two patents aggressively as doing so
might call their validity into question. Owners of a dozen or more
patents covering a particular technology would seem far less
reticent.
Systematic consolidation of patent rights might
significantly change these circumstances, suggesting possible
changes to public perception of the patent system and to patent law
doctrines governing transfer of patent rights and remedies law.
CONCLUSION
Since the first Fordham International Intellectual Property
Conference, the U.S. patent system has changed in fundamental
ways. A number of defining moments have marked its transition
from a perhaps overbold Golden Age to a Silver Age of greater
maturity, nuance, and at times doubt. Numerous challenges face
the contemporary patent regime in the United States, yet most
should agree that its current configuration better suits the global
technology community it is designed to serve. And even as the
U.S. patent law has evolved, it has sustained and nurtured a range
of technologies that could have scarcely been imagined twenty
years ago. So will it again, over the next two decades and beyond.

